basic invention

пат. основное изобретение (изобретение, которое юридически и технически не связано

с какими-л. другими изобретениями, и поэтому может применяться самостоятельно)

- invention covered by a patent

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1) общ. открытие, изобретение (установление неизвестных ранее объективно существующих закономерностей или явлений окружающего мира, а также способов организации материи или человеческой деятельности для получения какого-л. практического результата)

2) пат. изобретение (новое техническое решение задачи, поднимающее существующий уровень техники)

SUBJECT AREA: Agricultural and food technology, Textiles

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Edmund Cartwright, the fourth son of William Cartwright, was educated at Wakefield Grammar School, and went to University College, Oxford, at the age of 14. By special act of convocation in 1764, he was elected Fellow of Magdalen College. He married Alice Whitaker in 1772 and soon after was given the ecclesiastical living of Brampton in Derbyshire. In 1779 he was presented with the living of Goadby, Marwood, Leicestershire, where he wrote poems, reviewed new works, and began agricultural experiments. A visit to Matlock in the summer of 1784 introduced him to the inventions of Richard Arkwright and he asked why weaving could not be mechanized in a similar manner to spinning. This began a remarkable career of inventions.

Cartwright returned home and built a loom which required two strong men to operate it. This was the first attempt in England to develop a power loom. It had a vertical warp, the reed fell with the weight of at least half a hundredweight and, to quote Gartwright's own words, "the springs which threw the shuttle were strong enough to throw a Congreive [sic] rocket" (Strickland 19.71:8—for background to the "rocket" comparison, see Congreve, Sir William). Nevertheless, it had the same three basics of weaving that still remain today in modern power looms: shedding or dividing the warp; picking or projecting the shuttle with the weft; and beating that pick of weft into place with a reed. This loom he proudly patented in 1785, and then he went to look at hand looms and was surprised to see how simply they operated. Further improvements to his own loom, covered by two more patents in 1786 and 1787, produced a machine with the more conventional horizontal layout that showed promise; however, the Manchester merchants whom he visited were not interested. He patented more improvements in 1788 as a result of the experience gained in 1786 through establishing a factory at Doncaster with power looms worked by a bull that were the ancestors of modern ones. Twenty-four looms driven by steam-power were installed in Manchester in 1791, but the mill was burned down and no one repeated the experiment. The Doncaster mill was sold in 1793, Cartwright having lost £30,000, However, in 1809 Parliament voted him £10,000 because his looms were then coming into general use.

In 1789 he began working on a wool-combing machine which he patented in 1790, with further improvements in 1792. This seems to have been the earliest instance of mechanized combing. It used a circular revolving comb from which the long fibres or "top" were. carried off into a can, and a smaller cylinder-comb for teasing out short fibres or "noils", which were taken off by hand. Its output equalled that of twenty hand combers, but it was only relatively successful. It was employed in various Leicestershire and Yorkshire mills, but infringements were frequent and costly to resist. The patent was prolonged for fourteen years after 1801, but even then Cartwright did not make any profit. His 1792 patent also included a machine to make ropes with the outstanding and basic invention of the "cordelier" which he communicated to his friends, including Robert Fulton, but again it brought little financial benefit. As a result of these problems and the lack of remuneration for his inventions, Cartwright moved to London in 1796 and for a time lived in a house built with geometrical bricks of his own design.

Other inventions followed fast, including a tread-wheel for cranes, metallic packing for pistons in steam-engines, and bread-making and brick-making machines, to mention but a few. He had already returned to agricultural improvements and he put forward suggestions in 1793 for a reaping machine. In 1801 he received a prize from the Board of Agriculture for an essay on husbandry, which was followed in 1803 by a silver medal for the invention of a three-furrow plough and in 1805 by a gold medal for his essay on manures. From 1801 to 1807 he ran an experimental farm on the Duke of Bedford's estates at Woburn.

From 1786 until his death he was a prebendary of Lincoln. In about 1810 he bought a small farm at Hollanden near Sevenoaks, Kent, where he continued his inventions, both agricultural and general. Inventing to the last, he died at Hastings and was buried in Battle church.

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SUBJECT AREA: Mechanical, pneumatic and hydraulic engineering, Photography, film and optics, Public utilities

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While he was attending the Military School at Mannheim, Reichenbach drew attention to himself due to the mathematical instruments that he had designed. On the recommendation of Count Rumford in Munich, the Bavarian government financed a two-year stay in Britain so that Reichenbach could become acquainted with modern mechanical engineering. He returned to Mannheim in 1793, and during the Napoleonic Wars he was involved in the manufacture of arms. In Munich, where he was in the service of the Bavarian state from 1796, he started producing precision instruments in his own time. His basic invention was the design of a dividing machine for circles, produced at the end of the eighteenth century. The astronomic and geodetic instruments he produced excelled all the others for their precision. His telescopes in particular, being perfect in use and of solid construction, soon brought him an international reputation. They were manufactured at the MathematicMechanical Institute, which he had jointly founded with Joseph Utzschneider and Joseph Liebherr in 1804 and which became a renowned training establishment. The glasses and lenses were produced by Joseph Fraunhofer who joined the company in 1807.

In the same year he was put in charge of the technical reorganization of the salt-works at Reichenhall. After he had finished the brine-transport line from Reichenhall to Traunstein in 1810, he started on the one from Berchtesgaden to Reichenhall which was an extremely difficult task because of the mountainous area that had to be crossed. As water was the only source of energy available he decided to use water-column engines for pumping the brine in the pipes of both lines. Such devices had been in use for pumping purposes in different mining areas since the middle of the eighteenth century. Reichenbach knew about the one constructed by Joseph Karl Hell in Slovakia, which in principle had just been a simple piston-pump driven by water which did not work satisfactorily. Instead he constructed a really effective double-action water-column engine; this was a short time after Richard Trevithick had constructed a similar machine in England. For the second line he improved the system and built a single-action pump. All the parts of it were made of metal, which made them easy to produce, and the pumps proved to be extremely reliable, working for over 100 years.

At the official opening of the line in 1817 the Bavarian king rewarded him generously. He remained in the state's service, becoming head of the department for roads and waterways in 1820, and he contributed to the development of Bavarian industry as well as the public infrastructure in many ways as a result of his mechanical skill and his innovative engineering mind.

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SUBJECT AREA: Textiles

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It would seem that most of the stories about Lee's invention of the stocking frame cannot be verified by any contemporary evidence, and the first written accounts do not appear until the second half of the seventeenth century. The claim that he was Master of Arts from St John's College, Cambridge, was first made in 1607 but cannot be checked because the records have not survived. The date for the invention of the knitting machine as being 1589 was made at the same time, but again there is no supporting evidence. There is no evidence that Lee was Vicar of Calverton, nor that he was in Holy Orders at all. Likewise there is no evidence for the existence of the woman, whether she was girlfriend, fiancée or wife, who is said to have inspired the invention, and claims regarding the involvement of Queen Elizabeth I and her refusal to grant a patent because the stockings were wool and not silk are also without contemporary foundation. Yet the first known reference shows that Lee was the inventor of the knitting machine, for the partnership agreement between him and George Brooke dated 6 June 1600 states that "William Lee hath invented a very speedy manner of making works usually wrought by knitting needles as stockings, waistcoats and such like". This agreement was to last for twenty-two years, but terminated prematurely when Brooke was executed for high treason in 1603. Lee continued to try and exploit his invention, for in 1605 he described himself as "Master of Arts" when he petitioned the Court of Aldermen of the City of London as the first inventor of an engine to make silk stockings. In 1609 the Weavers' Company of London recorded Lee as "a weaver of silk stockings by engine". These petitions suggest that he was having difficulty in establishing his invention, which may be why in 1612 there is a record of him in Rouen, France, where he hoped to have better fortune. If he had been invited there by Henry IV, his hopes were dashed by the assassination of the king soon afterwards. He was to supply four knitting machines, and there is further evidence that he was in France in 1615, but it is thought that he died in that country soon afterwards.

The machine Lee invented was probably the most complex of its day, partly because the need to use silk meant that the needles were very fine. Henson (1970) in 1831 took five pages in his book to describe knitting on a stocking frame which had over 2,066 pieces. To knit a row of stitches took eleven separate stages, and great care and watchfulness were required to ensure that all the loops were equal and regular. This shows how complex the machines were and points to Lee's great achievement in actually making one. The basic principles of its operation remained unaltered throughout its extraordinarily long life, and a few still remained in use commercially in the early 1990s.

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 ■ Storr, A. (1993). The dynamics of creation. New York: Ballantine Books. (Originally published in 1972.)

 ■ Stumpf, S. E. (1994). Philosophy: History and problems (5th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.

 ■ Sulloway, F. J. (1996). Born to rebel: Birth order, family dynamics, and creative lives. New York: Random House/Vintage Books.

 ■ Thorndike, E. L. (1906). Principles of teaching. New York: A. G. Seiler.

 ■ Thorndike, E. L. (1970). Animal intelligence: Experimental studies. Darien, CT: Hafner Publishing Co. (Originally published in 1911.)

 ■ Titchener, E. B. (1910). A textbook of psychology. New York: Macmillan.

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 ■ Tyler, S. A. (1978). The said and the unsaid: Mind, meaning, and culture. New York: Academic Press.

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SUBJECT AREA: Metallurgy

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Thomas was educated at Dulwich College and from the age of 17, for the next twelve years, he made his living as a police-court clerk, although he studied chemistry in his spare time as an evening student at Birkbeck College, London. While there, he heard of the difficulties encountered by the Bessemer steelmaking process, which at that time was limited to using phosphorus-free iron. Any of this element present in the iron was oxidized to phosphoric acid, which would not react with the acidic lining in the converter, with the result that it would remain in the iron and render it too brittle to use. Unfortunately, phosphoric iron ores are more common than those free of this harmful element. Thomas was attracted by the view that a fortune awaited anyone who could solve this problem, and was not discouraged by the failure of several august figures in the industry, including Siemens and Lowthian Bell.

Thomas's knowledge of chemistry taught him that whereas an acidic lining allowed the phosphorus to remain in the iron, a basic lining would react with it to form part of the slag, which could then be tapped off. His experiments to find a suitable material were conducted in difficult conditions, in his spare time with meagre apparatus. Finally he found that a converter lined with dolomite, a form of limestone, would succeed, and he appealed to his cousin Percy Carlyle Gilchrist, Chemist at the Blaenavon Ironworks in Monmouthshire, for help in carrying out pilot-scale trials. In 1879 he gave up his police-court job to devote himself to the work, and in the same year they patented the Thomas- Gilchrist process. The first licence to use it was granted to Bolckow, Vaughan \& Co. of Middlesborough, and there the first steel was made in a basic Bessemer converter on 4 April 1879. The process was rapidly taken up and spread widely in Europe and beyond and was applied to other furnaces. Thomas made a fortune, but his health did not long allow him to enjoy it, for he died at the early age of 34.

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- plural necessities - noun (something needed or essential: Food is one of the necessities of life.) necesidad

necessity n necesidad

El plural de necessity se escribe necessities

tr[nɪ'sesɪtɪ]

noun (pl necessities)

1 necesidad nombre femenino

■ it's a necessity es indispensable

2 (item) requisito indispensable

\

necessity is the mother of invention la necesidad aviva el ingenio

of necessity inevitablemente

to make a virtue out of necessity hacer de la necesidad una virtud

necessity [nɪ'sɛsət̬i] n, pl - ties

1) need: necesidad f

2) requirement: requisito m indispensable

3) poverty: indigencia f, necesidad f

4) inevitability: inevitabilitad f

• indigencia s.f.

• necesidad s.f.

• precisión s.f.

• requisito indispensable s.m.

noun (pl - ties)

1)

a) ( imperative need) (no pl) necesidad f

b) u ( inevitability) inevitabilidad f

2) c ( necessary item)

[nɪ'sesɪtɪ]

1) (=need) necesidad f

- necessity is the mother of invention

2) (=necessary thing) necesidad f

3) (=unavoidable thing)

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noun (pl - ties)

1)

a) ( imperative need) (no pl) necesidad f

b) u ( inevitability) inevitabilidad f

2) c ( necessary item)

SUBJECT AREA: Photography, film and optics

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Carlson studied physics at the California Institute of Technology and in 1930 he took a research position at Bell Telephone Laboratories, but soon transferred to their patent department. To equip himself in this field, Carlson studied law, and in 1934 he became a patent attorney at P.R.Mallory \& Co., makers of electrical apparatus. He was struck by the difficulty in obtaining copies of documents and drawings; indeed, while still at school, he had encountered printing problems in trying to produce a newsletter for amateur chemists. He began experimenting with various light-sensitive substances, and by 1937 he had conceived the basic principles of xerography ("dry writing"), using the property of certain substances of losing an electrostatic charge when light impinges on them. His work for Mallory brought him into contact with the Battelle Memorial Institute, the world's largest non-profit research organization; their subsidiary, set up to develop promising ideas, took up Carlson's invention. Carlson received his first US patent for the process in 1940, with two more in 1942, and he assigned to Battelle exclusive patent rights in return for a share of any future proceeds. It was at Battelle that selenium was substituted as the light-sensitive material.

In 1946 the Haloid Company of Rochester, manufacturers of photographic materials and photocopying equipment, heard of the Xerox copier and, seeing it as a possible addition to their products, took out a licence to develop it commercially. The first Xerox Copier was tested during 1949 and put on the market the following year. The process soon began to displace older methods, such as Photostat, but its full impact on the public came in 1959 with the advent of the Xerox 914 Copier. It is fair to apply the overworked word "revolution" to the change in copying methods initiated by Carlson. He became a multimillionaire from his royalties and stock holding, and in his last years he was able to indulge in philanthropic activities.

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SUBJECT AREA: Textiles

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Jacquard was apprenticed at the age of 12 to bookbinding, and later to type-founding and cutlery. His parents, who had some connection with weaving, left him a small property upon their death. He made some experiments with pattern weaving, but lost all his inheritance; after marrying, he returned to type-founding and cutlery. In 1790 he formed the idea for his machine, but it was forgotten amidst the excitement of the French Revolution, in which he fought for the Revolutionists at the defence of Lyons. The machine he completed in 1801 combined earlier inventions and was for weaving net. He was sent to Paris to demonstrate it at the National Exposition and received a bronze medal. In 1804 Napoleon granted him a patent, a pension of 1,500 francs and a premium on each machine sold. This enabled him to study and work at the Conservatoire des Arts et Métiers to perfect his mechanism for pattern weaving. A method of selecting any combination of leashes at each shoot of the weft had to be developed, and Jacquard's mechanism was the outcome of various previous inventions. By taking the cards invented by Falcon in 1728 that were punched with holes like the paper of Bouchon in 1725, to select the needles for each pick, and by placing the apparatus above the loom where Vaucanson had put his mechanism, Jacquard combined the best features of earlier inventions. He was not entirely successful because his invention failed in the way it pressed the card against the needles; later modifications by Breton in 1815 and Skola in 1819 were needed before it functioned reliably. However, the advantage of Jacquard's machine was that each pick could be selected much more quickly than on the earlier draw looms, which meant that John Kay's flying shuttle could be introduced on fine pattern looms because the weaver no longer had to wait for the drawboy to sort out the leashes for the next pick. Robert Kay's drop box could also be used with different coloured wefts. The drawboy could be dispensed with because the foot-pedal operating the Jacquard mechanism could be worked by the weaver. Patterns could be changed quickly by replacing one set of cards with another, but the scope of the pattern was more limited than with the draw loom. Some machines that were brought into use aroused bitter hostility. Jacquard suffered physical violence, barely escaping with his life, and his machines were burnt by weavers at Lyons. However, by 1812 his mechanism began to be generally accepted and had been applied to 11,000 draw-looms in France. In 1819 Jacquard received a gold medal and a Cross of Honour for his invention. His machines reached England c.1816 and still remain the basic way of weaving complicated patterns.

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SUBJECT AREA: Mining and extraction technology

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From an old mining family in the Saxon coalfields, Wolf was aware from his youth of the urgent demand for a miner's lamp which would provide adequate light but not provoke firedamp explosions. While working as an engineer in Zwickau, Wolf spent his spare time conducting experiments for such a lamp. The basic concept of his invention was the principle that dangerous concentrations of methane and air would not explode within a small pipe; this had been established almost seventy years earlier by the English chemist Humphrey Davy. By combining and developing certain devices designed by earlier inventors, in 1883 Wolf produced a prototype with a glass cylinder, a primer fixed inside the lamp and a magnetic lock. Until the successful application of electric light, Wolfs invention was the safest and most popular mining safety lamp. Many earlier inventions had failed to address all the problems of lighting for mines; Davy's lamp, for example, would too quickly become sooty and hot. As Wolfs lamp burned petroleum spirit, at first it was mistrusted outside Saxony, but it successfully passed the safety tests in all the leading coal-producing countries at that time. As well as casting a safe, constant light, the appearance of the cap flame could indicate the concentration of fire-damp in the air, thus providing an additional safety measure. Wolfs first patent was soon followed by many others in several countries, and underwent many developments. In 1884 Heinrich Friemann, a merchant from Eisleben, invested capital in the new company of Friemann and Wolf, which became the leading producer of miners' safety lamps. By 1914 they had manufactured over one million lamps, and the company had branches in major mining districts worldwide.

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1. n

1) ценность

2) стоимость

3) цена

4) валюта; сумма векселя или тратты

5) величина, значение

2. v

   1) The Book of Nature Is Written in the Language of Mathematics

   Philosophy is written in that great book, the universe, which is always open, right before our eyes. But one cannot understand this book without first learning to understand the language and to know the characters in which it is written. It is written in the language of mathematics, and the characters are triangles, circles, and other figures. Without these, one cannot understand a single word of it, and just wanders in a dark labyrinth. (Galileo, 1990, p. 232)

   2) Arranging Speech so as to Reply Appropriately

   It never happens that it [a nonhuman animal] arranges its speech in various ways in order to reply appropriately to everything that may be said in its presence, as even the lowest type of man can do. (Descartes, 1970a, p. 116)

   3) No Other Animal Has the Language Capacity of the Human

   It is a very remarkable fact that there are none so depraved and stupid, without even excepting idiots, that they cannot arrange different words together, forming of them a statement by which they make known their thoughts; while, on the other hand, there is no other animal, however perfect and fortunately circumstanced it may be, which can do the same. (Descartes, 1967, p. 116)

   4) Human Beings Do Not Live Only in the World of Objects

   Human beings do not live in the object world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built on the language habits of the group.... We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation. (Sapir, 1921, p. 75)

   5) Language Powerfully Conditions All Our Thinking

   It powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes.... No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same worlds with different labels attached. (Sapir, 1985, p. 162)

   6) A List of Language Games

   [A list of language games, not meant to be exhaustive:]

   Giving orders, and obeying them- Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements- Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)Reporting an eventSpeculating about an eventForming and testing a hypothesisPresenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagramsMaking up a story; and reading itPlay actingSinging catchesGuessing riddlesMaking a joke; and telling it

   Solving a problem in practical arithmeticTranslating from one language into another

   LANGUAGE Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, and praying-. (Wittgenstein, 1953, Pt. I, No. 23, pp. 11 e-12 e)

   7) Language Constrains Certain Modes of Interpretation

   We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages.... The world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... No individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 153, 213-214)

   8) We Dissect Nature in Accordance with Our Native Languages

   We dissect nature along the lines laid down by our native languages.

   The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar or can in some way be calibrated. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 213-214)

   9) The Forms of a Person's Thoughts Are Controlled by Unperceived Patterns of His Own Language

   The forms of a person's thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate systematizations of his own language-shown readily enough by a candid comparison and contrast with other languages, especially those of a different linguistic family. (Whorf, 1956, p. 252)

    10) The Analysis of Certain Types of Utterances

   It has come to be commonly held that many utterances which look like statements are either not intended at all, or only intended in part, to record or impart straightforward information about the facts.... Many traditional philosophical perplexities have arisen through a mistake-the mistake of taking as straightforward statements of fact utterances which are either (in interesting non-grammatical ways) nonsensical or else intended as something quite different. (Austin, 1962, pp. 2-3)

    11) The Dictionary of a Language Is a System of Concepts

   In general, one might define a complex of semantic components connected by logical constants as a concept. The dictionary of a language is then a system of concepts in which a phonological form and certain syntactic and morphological characteristics are assigned to each concept. This system of concepts is structured by several types of relations. It is supplemented, furthermore, by redundancy or implicational rules..., representing general properties of the whole system of concepts.... At least a relevant part of these general rules is not bound to particular languages, but represents presumably universal structures of natural languages. They are not learned, but are rather a part of the human ability to acquire an arbitrary natural language. (Bierwisch, 1970, pp. 171-172)

    12) Talk about the Evolution of the Language Capacity is Beside the Point

   In studying the evolution of mind, we cannot guess to what extent there are physically possible alternatives to, say, transformational generative grammar, for an organism meeting certain other physical conditions characteristic of humans. Conceivably, there are none-or very few-in which case talk about evolution of the language capacity is beside the point. (Chomsky, 1972, p. 98)

    13) The Development of Language

   [It is] truth value rather than syntactic well-formedness that chiefly governs explicit verbal reinforcement by parents-which renders mildly paradoxical the fact that the usual product of such a training schedule is an adult whose speech is highly grammatical but not notably truthful. (R. O. Brown, 1973, p. 330)

    14) Sentential and Conceptual Levels in Language

   he conceptual base is responsible for formally representing the concepts underlying an utterance.... A given word in a language may or may not have one or more concepts underlying it.... On the sentential level, the utterances of a given language are encoded within a syntactic structure of that language. The basic construction of the sentential level is the sentence.

   The next highest level... is the conceptual level. We call the basic construction of this level the conceptualization. A conceptualization consists of concepts and certain relations among those concepts. We can consider that both levels exist at the same point in time and that for any unit on one level, some corresponding realizate exists on the other level. This realizate may be null or extremely complex.... Conceptualizations may relate to other conceptualizations by nesting or other specified relationships. (Schank, 1973, pp. 191-192)

    15) Linguistic Realities Have Not Yet Been Captured by Theoretical Models

   The mathematics of multi-dimensional interactive spaces and lattices, the projection of "computer behavior" on to possible models of cerebral functions, the theoretical and mechanical investigation of artificial intelligence, are producing a stream of sophisticated, often suggestive ideas.

   But it is, I believe, fair to say that nothing put forward until now in either theoretic design or mechanical mimicry comes even remotely in reach of the most rudimentary linguistic realities. (Steiner, 1975, p. 284)

    16) The Final Steps to Human Language

   The step from the simple tool to the master tool, a tool to make tools (what we would now call a machine tool), seems to me indeed to parallel the final step to human language, which I call reconstitution. It expresses in a practical and social context the same understanding of hierarchy, and shows the same analysis by function as a basis for synthesis. (Bronowski, 1977, pp. 127-128)

    17) The Inadequacy of Formal Linguistic Models for Ordinary Language Usage

    t is the language donn eґ in which we conduct our lives.... We have no other. And the danger is that formal linguistic models, in their loosely argued analogy with the axiomatic structure of the mathematical sciences, may block perception.... It is quite conceivable that, in language, continuous induction from simple, elemental units to more complex, realistic forms is not justified. The extent and formal "undecidability" of context-and every linguistic particle above the level of the phoneme is context-bound-may make it impossible, except in the most abstract, meta-linguistic sense, to pass from "pro-verbs," "kernals," or "deep deep structures" to actual speech. (Steiner, 1975, pp. 111-113)

    18) When a Language Is an Abstract Machine

   A higher-level formal language is an abstract machine. (Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 113)

    19) Metaphor and Metonymy Underpin the Formation of Linguistic Signs

   Jakobson sees metaphor and metonymy as the characteristic modes of binarily opposed polarities which between them underpin the two-fold process of selection and combination by which linguistic signs are formed.... Thus messages are constructed, as Saussure said, by a combination of a "horizontal" movement, which combines words together, and a "vertical" movement, which selects the particular words from the available inventory or "inner storehouse" of the language. The combinative (or syntagmatic) process manifests itself in contiguity (one word being placed next to another) and its mode is metonymic. The selective (or associative) process manifests itself in similarity (one word or concept being "like" another) and its mode is metaphoric. The "opposition" of metaphor and metonymy therefore may be said to represent in effect the essence of the total opposition between the synchronic mode of language (its immediate, coexistent, "vertical" relationships) and its diachronic mode (its sequential, successive, lineal progressive relationships). (Hawkes, 1977, pp. 77-78)

    20) Language and the Analysis of Nature

   It is striking that the layered structure that man has given to language constantly reappears in his analyses of nature. (Bronowski, 1977, p. 121)

    21) Correspondence Rules for Mapping Old Theory into Subsets of New Theory

   First, [an ideal intertheoretic reduction] provides us with a set of rules"correspondence rules" or "bridge laws," as the standard vernacular has it-which effect a mapping of the terms of the old theory (T o) onto a subset of the expressions of the new or reducing theory (T n). These rules guide the application of those selected expressions of T n in the following way: we are free to make singular applications of their correspondencerule doppelgangers in T o....

   Second, and equally important, a successful reduction ideally has the outcome that, under the term mapping effected by the correspondence rules, the central principles of T o (those of semantic and systematic importance) are mapped onto general sentences of T n that are theorems of Tn. (P. Churchland, 1979, p. 81)

    22) The Inclusion of Non- linguistic Factors in a Theory of Grammar

   If non-linguistic factors must be included in grammar: beliefs, attitudes, etc. [this would] amount to a rejection of the initial idealization of language as an object of study. A priori such a move cannot be ruled out, but it must be empirically motivated. If it proves to be correct, I would conclude that language is a chaos that is not worth studying.... Note that the question is not whether beliefs or attitudes, and so on, play a role in linguistic behavior and linguistic judgments... [but rather] whether distinct cognitive structures can be identified, which interact in the real use of language and linguistic judgments, the grammatical system being one of these. (Chomsky, 1979, pp. 140, 152-153)

    23) Language Is Inevitably Influenced by Specific Contexts of Human Interaction

   Language cannot be studied in isolation from the investigation of "rationality." It cannot afford to neglect our everyday assumptions concerning the total behavior of a reasonable person.... An integrational linguistics must recognize that human beings inhabit a communicational space which is not neatly compartmentalized into language and nonlanguage.... It renounces in advance the possibility of setting up systems of forms and meanings which will "account for" a central core of linguistic behavior irrespective of the situation and communicational purposes involved. (Harris, 1981, p. 165)

    24) The Genetic Blueprints of Language

   By innate [linguistic knowledge], Chomsky simply means "genetically programmed." He does not literally think that children are born with language in their heads ready to be spoken. He merely claims that a "blueprint is there, which is brought into use when the child reaches a certain point in her general development. With the help of this blueprint, she analyzes the language she hears around her more readily than she would if she were totally unprepared for the strange gabbling sounds which emerge from human mouths. (Aitchison, 1987, p. 31)

    25) Languages Are Machines

   Looking at ourselves from the computer viewpoint, we cannot avoid seeing that natural language is our most important "programming language." This means that a vast portion of our knowledge and activity is, for us, best communicated and understood in our natural language.... One could say that natural language was our first great original artifact and, since, as we increasingly realize, languages are machines, so natural language, with our brains to run it, was our primal invention of the universal computer. One could say this except for the sneaking suspicion that language isn't something we invented but something we became, not something we constructed but something in which we created, and recreated, ourselves. (Leiber, 1991, p. 8)

1)

а) эк. продукт, изделие, товар (предмет, созданный человеком, машиной или природой; чаще всего имеются в виду предметы, созданные с целью продажи); мн. продукция

б) эк. продукт, объем продукции ( количество произведенных товаров или услуг)

2) общ. результат, продукт (итог какой-л. деятельности)

3) мат. произведение ( результат умножения двух чисел)

* * *

* * *

* * *

1) заявка (заявка на патент - это комплект документов, состоящий из: ходатайства, описания изобретения, чертежей, формулы изобретения, присяги или торжественного заявления изобретателя и подтверждения уплаты заявочной пошлины)

2) заявление, прошение, ходатайство

3) применение, употребление

4) внесение (напр. поправки)

5) прикладная задача, прикладная система

•

- application allowed to proceed

- reissue application

- rejected application

* * *

1) требование, притязание; притязать

2) утверждение; заявление; утверждать; заявлять

3) претензия

4) формула изобретения, патентная формула

5) пункт формулы изобретения (однозвенная формула изобретения или пункт многозвенной формулы, способный быть объектом самостоятельной охраны)

•

- according to claim

* * *